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Introduction
1 Like  most  scholars  of  Dewey’s  aesthetics,  Thomas  Alexander  (who may be  counted
foremost under that banner), has a tendency to see in Dewey’s work an inextricable
tendency toward unity. Aesthetic experience in Dewey’s Art as Experience, turns on the
concept of ‘fusion’ in which meanings are ‘fused’ into aesthetic wholes which can be
embodied  in  art.  Aesthetic  experiences,  taking  in  hand  Dewey’s  understanding  of
‘experience’ as objective process involving the interplay of nature and culture, is no
longer a subjective or mystical kind of experience that can be safely differentiated from
other kinds of experience, e.g. scientific, moral, religious, etc. Indeed, one of the things
which the essays collected in this book shows with remarkable clarity, is just how far
Dewey was willing to go in reconstructing the concept of experience; experience is not
simply passive reception, but active engagement in projects of reconstruction in which
concepts and the world itself are (often radically) developed and remade according the
purposes of the inquirer (or better yet, artist) through the world in which she lives, and
that this reconstruction is carried out in the aim of securing a world rich in meaning
and value. Thus, we see, through Alexander, the true thrust of Dewey’s incredibly rich
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naturalism: nature and culture are one, despite the differences between the two, and
only because of this underlying continuity can culture (in the form of artistic inquiry)
remake itself and nature through processes of deliberative inquiry. 
2 Alexander sees his project as more than simply exploring the themes and devices in
Dewey’s work. He sees the essays collected as his attempts to “explore what may be
called an ‘aesthetics of  existence’  in terms of an ecological,  humanistic naturalism”
(HE: 1).  The  word ‘naturalism’  carries  a  long history  around with  it,  going  back  to
Aristotle’s Physics,  and re-appearing many times under many guises in the canon of
Western Philosophy. However, Alexander’s understanding of naturalism, compounded
with  his  rather  original  conception  of  an  ‘ecological  ontology’  and  a  rich,
anthropologically tinged humanism, is far from the norm of contemporary philosophy;
perhaps  even  contemporary  pragmatism.  Furthermore,  Alexander’s  project  is  not
simply to re-define naturalism along grounds more favourable to himself and Dewey.
His humanism, which he understands along the lines of an ‘existential phenomenology’
– think Merleau-Ponty, rather than Heidegger or Sartre – is a means to a rethinking of
‘Western Ontology’ along the same lines which Dewey did in books like Experience and
Nature and Art as Experience, but also in books like Essays in Experimental Logic and Logic:
the  Theory  of  Inquiry. And  part  of  this  effort  requires  humanizing  nature  and
naturalizing  culture  all  in  the  same  move.  Hence,  the  move  from  aesthetics  to
humanism to ecological naturalism. Seeing the unity of experience requires that art
(and artifice)  be  taken as  continual  with nature.  Seeing human values  in  this  light
reconnects them with the natural world in terms of a genetic or emergence story of
their  development  out  of  nature.  This  breaks  the  ground to  plant  the  seeds  of  an
‘ecological’ ontology, one which fuses the two previous moves into an ontology which
can support at the epistemic and aesthetic levels that which reveals this ontological
move as necessary in the first place. Naturalism, in Alexander’s understanding, must be
broadened beyond an epistemic criterion into an ontology which affords the weaving of
‘spiritual ecologies’.
3 The  book  itself  consists  of  essays  spanning  more  than  two  decades  of  Alexander’s
admirable  philosophical  career,  uniting  studies  of  Dewey,  Santayana,  Royce,  and
classical  pragmatism  all  under  the  banner  of  his  general  approach  to  develop  a
coherent grounds and possible defence of the ontological aspect of naturalism along
Deweyan lines,  and indeed beyond.  The book contains  two essays  which will  be  of
special interest to first time students of Dewey – an (aptly named) essay on the difficult
first  chapter  of  Experience  and  Nature, and  a  fascinating  essay  on  Dewey’s  equally
difficult book on religion, A Common Faith. Along with this are several essays on Native
American philosophy which Alexander uses to great effect to not only actively practice
the pluralism which pragmatism requires,  but  further to stretch and play with the
understanding of naturalism as a conceptual approach. The essays on Santayana and
Royce put Dewey in a category of American naturalism which attempts to see spirit and
not science as the fundamental cause of human action, something which contemporary
pragmatists  (avowed  naturalists)  have  ignored  or  derided.  The  book  is  a  timely
collection  of  incisive  and  delightfully  written  essays  which  capture  the  fire  of  an
argument a long time in the making. 
4 In this review, however, I should like to put the above general comments (which I think
capture the fire of Alexander’s understanding of Dewey and, indeed, a criticism of the
direction of contemporary pragmatism under analytic philosophy) to the test and see,
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in true pragmatist fashion, if they work. One of the things which I (and others) have
found so compelling about Dewey’s work is the attention he paid to the breakdowns of
experience,  the  indeterminacies  and  confusions,  which  coalesce  into  his  most
important  conceptual  device:  the  problematic  situation.  I  think  that  something  of
Dewey’s insights may be put at risk (if not lost altogether) by focusing on the unity
which emerges from aesthetic experiences. Dewey understood, perhaps better than any
other philosopher, alive or dead, that concepts, practices, culture itself, are forged in
the fire of the indeterminacies which nature is shot through with. Aesthetics, as the
guiding light of pragmatist research program, is in danger of privileging unity over the
diversity and indeterminacy which conditions the very possibility of such unity. 
 
Pragmatism as Epistemology or Philosophical
Anthropology?
5 A recent issue of the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy raised the
question of the direction of pragmatism wholesale in the 21st century. The question
was  posed  in  unequivocally  epistemic terms:  the  choice  for  pragmatists  is  between
language and experience. Presumably this disjunction was meant to hark to the typical
distinction drawn between classical- and neo-pragmatisms: neo-pragmatism has taken
the ‘linguistic  turn’,  where  classical  pragmatism is  still  beholden to  some (perhaps
‘subjectivist’) conception of experience. Neo-pragmatists see it as their great victory to
eschew all talk of ‘experience’ along Peircean, Jamesian, or Deweyan lines, in favour of
an approach that takes the ‘best’ ideas from these classical pragmatists and runs them
through a Wittgensteinian threshing machine, separating the classical chaff from the
wheat.
6 I think the most positive upshot of Thomas Alexander’s work in The Human Eros is to
challenge the basic validity of this disjunction. If we are to talk about the basic nature
of  pragmatism  it  need  not  be  a debate  about  whether  or  not  it  is  a  linguistically
founded epistemology or an experientially founded epistemology: and in The Human
Eros, Alexander sketches out a favourable alternative to this disjunction. We can, on
Alexander’s view, see pragmatism which offers a re-working of ontology on existential
grounds  which  affords  us  the  possibility  of  seeing  pragmatism  wholesale  as  a
philosophical anthropology instead of an epistemology. The upshot is not to dispense
with  the  epistemological  questions  which  pragmatism  raises  (that  might  well  be
impossible),  but  rather  to  reconceive  of  these  questions  in  line  with  an  existential
conception of meaning. This shift in the understanding of meaning as semantic content
and the questions of the normative character of that content (the linguistic paradigm
of pragmatism) to the conception of meaning as human need (construed on Deweyan
aesthetic lines, it must be said) is captured under the eponymous concept: ‘the Human
Eros’. This conception of meaning takes the best parts of Dewey’s aesthetics, namely
the idea of meaning as fulfilments and the idea that instrumental action must have
aesthetic or artistic fulfilments (and not simply further instrumental implication). The
Human Eros is a postulate which governs Alexander’s understanding of an aesthetics
lead pragmatism program which reconceives traditional epistemological, ontological,
and metaphysical questions along the lines of a philosophical anthropology. Meanings
are artefacts of human existence and all  this implies,  i.e.  finitude, the possibility of
failure (and thus success), and the orientation toward the future (356). To make this
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aspect of his project clear, Alexander develops at some length the idea of the ‘Human
Eros’, the eponymous concept which connotes “man’s search for meaning”, which he
gives a distinctly Deweyan tone, with talk of such meanings being rooted in a ‘primarily
qualitative’ engagement with the world (7). This takes some of Dewey’s keenest logical
insights (cf. “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism”, and “Qualitative Thought”) and
puts them to work in a broader ‘existential’ project, one which opens the way to the
ontological work which Alexander takes as given (though perhaps not understood) in
Dewey’s  own  work.  The  Human  Eros begins  with  recognising  the  phenomenological
facticity  of  our  ‘being-in-the-world’  as  firstly  non-cognitive/aesthetic,  secondly
humanistic, and thirdly depending on a rich ontology. 
 
Aesthetics, Anthropology, and Experience
7 I do not mean, by construing Alexander’s new book as a challenge, to say that it is all
challenge  and  no  proposals.  Nor  do  I  mean  to  say  that  it  is  an  un-flawed  choice
alternative to the dominant programs. Indeed, the introduction to this review promises
a criticism of Alexander’s book – centring on the taking as foundational for pragmatism
the aesthetics which Dewey developed. But this leaves out what one might think of as
the architectonic structure of Dewey’s work.  I  do not present this is  a knock down
criticism of Alexander’s work on Dewey, nor his own project in pragmatism; I present
this  argument  only  to  suggest  that  there  is  a  manner  of  construing  Dewey’s
understanding  of  the  need for  active  deliberation  which  preserves  the  undergone
(aesthetic)  and  indeed  founds  the  achievement  of  fulfilling  meanings  on  different
grounds. Existence, Dewey tells us, exhibits precariousness and stability in near equal
measure. Experience carries these traits with it, and the unity which emerges in the
artistic is hard won from this constant indeterminacy.
8 However, I still  need to cash out what I mean by the above claim. In Experience and
Nature, Dewey is roundly concerned with cashing out the metaphysical and ontological
implications  of  his  instrumentalist  understanding  of  experience  and  reality.
Experiences are temporal, situated, situational, expanses of action in which the unity of
the antecedent course of experience (habitual, unproblematic action) is lost. This unity
must  be  imaginatively  reconstructed  through  a  process  of  ‘transforming’  or
‘manipulating’ that indeterminate situation (indeterminate in its meaning, namely what
it signifies for us in terms of the possibilities of actions) into a determinate situation (a
situation which exhibits a unity). This is also Dewey’s definition of inquiry (Dewey J.,
1938,  Logic:  The  Theory  of  Inquiry, 104-5).  But  experience  is  not  inquiry:  that  is,  all
inquiries  are  experiences,  but  not  all  experiences  are  inquiries.  There  is  the  ever-
present undergone element, that which we suffer or enjoy (Dewey’s words) which is
decidedly  non-cognitive  in  the  dual  sense  of  not  being  either  an  inferential
construction  or  an  inferential  product,  nor  in  the  sense  of  being  capable  of
propositional  elucidation.  The  pervasive  quality  which  evokes  deliberative  thinking
(reflection, judgment, inquiry) is that sense of a situation which guides action along in
the first place. It sets the terms by which the problem is to be solved. It affords our
thinking and our conduct. And this is the reason why Alexander stresses the undergone
component of experience to the extent (correctly) that he does: to deny or misconstrue
the pervasive (undergone) quality in experiences is to commit the most pernicious and
pervasive  fallacy  which  Dewey  saw  in  the  history  of  philosophy  –  namely,  the
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intellectualist  fallacy, the view that all  experience is  knowing experience.  With this
diagnosis, Dewey sets a problematic for philosophy which demands that philosophy be
brought  back  to  existential  conceptions  of  meaning  rather  than  the  detached
epistemological philosophy which he sees in contemporary pragmatism. 
9 The understanding of experience sketched above is Dewey’s instrumentalism. What we
see  from  Alexander  is  Dewey’s  aesthetics.  For  Alexander,  what  is  key  for  Dewey’s
pragmatism  is  a  break  with  the  traditional  focus  on  inference  and  justification  in
favour of an approach in which thinking (and knowing) are contextualized into the
broader sweep of experience and being. And it is clear that Dewey wanted this to be the
upshot  of  his  philosophical  program.  Everywhere  in  Dewey’s  work  we  find  that
meanings,  facts,  values,  goodness,  justice,  aesthetic  quality  in  general,  and  artistic
experiences in particular, are collapsed into a genetic account of the emergence of such
qualities from an existential conception of being (which he terms ‘Eco-ontology’ – a
nuanced twist on Dewey’s understanding of the problematic situation) in which the
world is shot through with possibilities. For Alexander this is not an epistemological
convenience or a metaphysical doctrine, but a liberating aesthetic which captures the
fire of human being. And it is the basis for his demand that contemporary pragmatism
recognize that it is at its best when it abandons epistemology in favour of a thoroughly
existentialized and anthropological philosophy which sees pluralism in larger terms
than  securing  the  possibility  of  fruitful  disagreement  between  communities  with
varying or  clashing values  and more in terms of  the possibilities  of  a  multitude of
cultures to construct meaning systems along lines which though vastly different point
to an anthropological fact about humans; namely, that we need to have a world which
embodies  the  meanings  which  fulfil  us  –  and  this  ‘fulfilment’  bears  not  a  trace  of
subjectivism – and that this embodiment is the product of a process of imaginative
reconstruction of the world. The world is a problematic situation. And the world is
what is reconstructed, not solely the terms of discourse, or the methods of inquiry. 
10 All of this goes rather well with the idea that Dewey’s philosophy (especially Experience
and Nature and Art as Experience) need to be read as continual, with the former before
the  latter.  Art,  Dewey  tells  us  in  Chapter  9  of  Experience  and  Nature,  fulfils  the
instrumental  and  gives  it  the  possibility  of  becoming  artistic  conduct.  And  Art  as
Experience tells  us  that  Dewey,  when  talking  about  ‘art’,  meant  something  more
suggestive  of  artifice  or  production  than  he  did  art  in  its  museum  sense.  Artistic
experience is not the solitary possession of the artist, but is an achievement open to all,
and  the  means  to  this  level  of  action  is  not  via  an  epistemological  move  but  via
education. Art is a social achievement and a social responsibility, for to act artistically
means to secure goods in creative and imaginative manners and to give desires, wants,
and needs a greater and more fulfilling meaning than the simple achievement of them
through rash and unimaginative action. The Human Eros, Alexander’s ‘master concept’,
is  a  product of  viewing meaning along this Deweyan aesthetic line of  thinking,  but
there is  scant mention of the role of  indeterminacy (logical  and metaphysical)  that
conditions the possibility of this (conclusion) to the Deweyan line of thinking. Simply
put,  my  point  is  this:  Alexander,  in  focusing  on  the  aesthetic  leaves  out  the
indeterminacy  which  conditions  the  possibility  of  a  Dewey’s  theory  of  meaning
altogether. Without an absence of determinate signification (talk of aesthetics put aside
for a moment) there can be no determination of signification and a fortiori no fusion of
fulfilling meanings in the manner which ‘weaving spiritual ecologies’ would require.
Without the problematic situation to motivate thinking there is simply no thinking.
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Without  the need to  deliberate  we do not  deliberate  at  all  –  this  is  a  foundational
principle  of  pragmatism:  the  intellectualist  fallacy  requires  us  to  see  that  active
thinking is but a phase in passive (undergone) being. We are not, as Charles Taylor has
it, dealing with mediation of the world through concepts at all times in our mental life.
Our primary orientation to the world is non-cognitive. 
 
Flux, Indeterminacy, and Eros
11 It is through this ontological move we see the richness of Alexander’s approach – and,
indeed, the thrust of the critical point I  stated and wish to make, that an aesthetic
approach  may  well  miss  the  varieties  of  indeterminacy  which  underpin  Dewey’s
thought at large. The ontological move takes account of Dewey’s views on embodiment
(cf. Chapter Seven of Experience and Nature, “Nature, Life, and Body-Mind”) and roots
the imagination in this biological, and ontological, factor of being: imagination is “a
dynamic,  structuring  of  experience  that  arises  from  our  lived  embodiment”  (9).
Alexander proceeds to characterize the imagination according to the role in plays in
our experience in general: 
[…] initially [imagination] gives us patterns of possible actions that are rooted in
our  own vital  form but  gives  these  possibilities  as possibilities,  and so  open to
consideration apart from immediate action”. (9) 
12 This  approach is,  despite  the apparent focus on action and the role  of  deliberative
thinking, richly aesthetic. Possibilities as possibilities are not simply signs reducible to
their origin in a ‘grammar’ or ‘language game’ – a way of life – they are culminations
out  of  a  biologically  tinged ontology  which terminates  in  the  creation of  signs  for
conduct, signs which can be communicated and shared, yes, but which carry with them
the drama and narrative of a being for whom these possibilities are possibilities. And as
possibilities, they  can  be  distilled  from  immediate  experience,  the  qualitative,  non-
cognitive  experience  which  Dewey  described  as ‘having’,  and  applied  to  such
experience as instruments for purposes. But this view already presupposes – but does
not  explicate  –  that  this  function for  symbols  depends  on the  metaphysical,  and a
fortiori, logical indeterminacy which makes possibilities what they are. As Dewey notes
in  “The  Logic  of  Judgments  of  Practice”,  if  a  value  is  given  then  no  judgment  is
required. Possibilities, as possibilities of this or that situation (as given) depend on there
being  no  value  (no  judgment  as  to  future  conduct)  obtaining  –  there  is  logical
indeterminacy. And this indeterminacy is 1) rooted in the metaphysical indeterminacy
which characterizes nature,  and 2) is  the condition of possibility for possibilities as
possibilities. Focus on unity and consummation, the ‘had’ aspects of experience puts at
risk  (at  least  by  possible  omission)  the  conditions  of  possibility  of  that  unifying
experience in which meanings are fused to create consummate wholes – that is, art.
The point here is that unless Alexander is explicit in his understanding of the aesthetic
being underpinned by the instrumental  (as  we see Dewey thinking this  way in the
closing chapters of Experience and Nature) we cannot take it that the dimension of the
possible is as thoroughly integrated into experience as he would like.
13 My point is this: if Alexander wants to shift pragmatist philosophy toward the kind of
aesthetically  grounded  ontology  in  which  human  activity  is  seen  as  striving  to
construct  a  world  which supports  and fulfils  ‘the  Human Eros’,  then he  must  take
account of the background of indeterminacy which conditions the possibility of the
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kinds  of  fulfilling  meanings  which  emerge  from  artistic  conduct.  And  this  means
shifting the focus of the philosophical anthropology from its desired outcome (Eros
instead of Eris) toward the conditions which not only threaten that outcome but show
the  need  for  such  an  understanding  of  meaning  and  experience  and  show  those
conditions  (the  indeterminacy  which  emerges  non-cognitively  in  the  problematic
situation; the precarious nature of reality). Dewey writes in Experience and Nature:
Because of the mixture of the regular and that which cuts across stability, a good
object once experienced acquires ideal quality and attracts demand and effort to
itself.  A  particular  ideal  may  be  an  illusion,  but  having  ideals  is  no  illusion.  It
embodies features of existence. Although imagination is often fantastic it is also an
organ of nature; for it  is the appropriate phase of indeterminate events moving
toward eventualities that are now but possibilities.  A purely stable world would
permit of no illusions, but neither is it clothed in ideals. (Dewey 1925: 62)
14 Dewey’s understanding of the fragility of value and meaning in a world which is not
assured is not the grounds for pessimism but optimism and faith in the ingenuity of
imaginative, artistic conduct, to create a world of meaning. What Alexander perhaps
does not give enough voice to is the systematic place this understanding of frailty has
in Dewey’s philosophy. The Human Eros ought to be seen as an achievement in the face
of  indeterminacy,  but  furthermore  that  such  indeterminacy  is  the  condition  of
possibility of the achievement at bottom.
 
Conclusion
15 Thomas Alexander’s  book is  an important  contribution to  Dewey studies,  American
philosophy, and pragmatist philosophy in general.  The essays collected in this book
span the length and breadth of the issues which are faced by pragmatists (among other
philosophers and each other) and provides a unique and original way of seeing the
value of pragmatism, which shifts the focus away from the epistemology industry and
toward a philosophical anthropology which aims at understanding the possibilities of
the  emergence  and  preservation  of  meaning  along  existential  grounds.  This  new
ecological, ontological conception of naturalism frees pragmatism from the chains of
the  primarily  negative  thesis  of  methodological  naturalism and returns  the  human
touch to nature. One might say that Alexander has taken Santayana’s famed criticism of
Experience and Nature and ran with it. Santayana claimed that Dewey had infected the
category of nature with the human; for Santayana, despite being totally opposed to
reductionism and having a distinct spiritual element in his philosophy, it could not be
the case that nature could have cathedrals of human value – nature knows no norms.
But Alexander, in his quest for a humanistic, aesthetically rich, ecological ontology has
shown how this is not only possible, but that surely it must be the case if we are to
make  naturalism  a  plausible  thesis.  While  I  remain  discontent  with  his  lack  of
recognition  of  the  architectonic  structure  of  Dewey’s  philosophy  (logical  theory
revealing the dependence of inference on indeterminacies which really are natural,
thus paving the way for naturalistic metaphysics and then aesthetics), Dewey scholars
and contemporary pragmatists have a challenge to face: they must make naturalism
look as plausible, and indeed as desirable, as Alexander has.
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